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Whose crime? Arson, class warfare and
traders in Nairobi, 1940-20001
Claire C. Robertson
1 In  developed countries  unlicensed sellers  on the streets  are  summarily  fined and/or
arrested without public comment in most cases; most people earn their living in other
ways. In developing countries street life includes ever more vendors, whose illegality has
become a venue for government crime. In Kenya the struggle for existence pits poor
traders against the propertied classes and their ally, the government. I will suggest here
that arson is and was used against small-scale traders as a weapon of class warfare in an
inversion of the usual stereotype that would have the poor burning the property of the
rich as part of a revolution or out of resentment. In this case, repeatedly, under both
colonial and independent Kenyan governments, the propertied classes have ruthlessly
exercised  the  property  crime  of  arson  against  those  whose  meager  property  often
consists only of a ramshackle market stall and its contents.
2 But arson is only a part of the crime scene involving traders. The massive numbers of
poor  people  make  Western-style  prohibition  of  urban  street  culture  and  economic
activities almost impossible, but vested interests lobby for it relentlessly, while ordinary
police try to turn the situation to their advantage. The result is that criminalization of
ordinary traders’ activities has made crime pervasive and inevitable. This essay looks at
the  evolution  of  the  criminalization  of  small-scale  trade,  especially  street-selling,  in
Nairobi from 1940 to 2000 to explore how stringent population control measures were
first imposed by the British colonial government in an effort to suppress World War II era
hawking,  were  then  heightened  during  the  1950s  Emergency,  and  then  after
independence  in  1963  when  hawker  policy  was  transformed  into  an  instrument  for
corruption. Arbitrary and sometimes violent population control measures were exercised
first against hawkers in Nairobi in the 1940s, pioneering later Emergency policies that
might have included market arsons. A question raised is, just whose crime was/is at issue
in the continuing warfare waged against Nairobi traders, not only on the streets but also
in markets?
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3 Crime in Nairobi is a large topic but not a new one; it has been called Nairobbery. There
is, however, widespread agreement that crime has worsened significantly in recent years
at every level – from petty street crime to large-scale government corruption with many
stops between. Even large banks no longer guarantee the deposits of their customers due
to widespread malfeasance by employees in connection with ATM cards. The post-Moi
Kibaki government,  elected on an anti-corruption pledge,  still  has many of  the same
notoriously corrupt personnel, who have perpetuated the relentless exploitation that so
impoverishes  most  Kenyans.  Policies  sanctioned at  the  highest  levels  of  government
foster the institutionalization of crime in Nairobi with regard to the informal sector –
both within the sector and outside of it enabled by those very policies.
4 In this essay I shall demonstrate that arson particularly characterized the periods of the
1950s,  and the late 1990s to 2000,  while the whole span is  examined with particular
attention to  women traders,  often the  most  vulnerable  to  inimical  regulations.  Even
though it  is bifurcated by the transition to independence in 1963,  recent policy is as
antithetical to small traders, or perhaps even more so, as British colonial policies were. I
will  look primarily  at  arson in  connection with markets,  controls  on hawking as  an
occupation  and  on  hawkers  as  persons,  the  politicization  of  hawker  controls,  and
hawkers’ resistance. I will suggest that the criminalization of the ordinary activities of
traders  in  the  informal  sector  by  both  the  colonial  and  independent  Kenyan
governments,  making it necessary for ever-growing numbers of people to contravene
laws just to earn a living, has been accompanied by the criminalization of government,
especially in connection with attempts to control the informal sector. Insofar as traders
must  contravene  laws,  just  so  far  have  certain  government  branches  (not  without
internal  conflicts),  especially  some  of  the  police,  contravened  both  laws  and  ethical
standards not only to destroy trading premises and confiscate commodities, but also to
extort, assault, rob and otherwise terrorize traders. And employed through it all, wielded
by various interested parties, has been the most dreaded weapon of mass destruction for
traders, arson. Nonetheless, while arson bookends the period examined and frames the
experiences  of  many traders,  it  was  not  a  constant  but  seems to  represent  extreme
tensions within the highly stratified business sector and between poorer traders and
government.
 
The Great Gikomba Fire of 2000
5 Early in the morning of 6 September 2000 a fire began in Kamukunji in eastern Nairobi at
Gikomba Market, the largest market in Kenya, much of whose outdoor area is occupied
semi-legally or illegally by thousands of small-scale retailers selling a wide variety of
commodities. Two large storey buildings there housed much of Kenya’s garment industry.
Begun in the outdoor fish stalls, the fire spread rapidly, ultimately destroying most of the
market in its  eight-  hour path of  destruction.  There were three fatalities among the
sellers caused by the stress of losing everything; most sellers lost their livelihoods and the
buildings, the legal part of the market, were destroyed.
6 What  began this  fire  that  dwarfed all  others?  The various  explanations  reflect  their
sources and the market’s status as a multi-purpose site key to the lives of its population: a
homeless children’s campfire run amok; a food kiosk’s cooking fire not properly damped;
sabotage/arson by rival  business owners wishing to destroy the secondhand clothing
industry; a dispute between the market «owner», who collects rent from stallholders and
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his tenants; and/or corrupt government-official-sponsored arson intended to obtain the
land so it could be sold to developers2. Gikomba traders claimed that a gang of arsonists
set the fire and battled with market guards and sellers who tried to fight it. The Nairobi
fire department’s single engine arrived two hours after the fire began but had no reliable
water source, so their efforts proved ineffective. The resultant catastrophe was profound
for the thousands whose livelihoods depended on Gikomba.
 
Heightening Class Differences as Trader Policy in the
1940s: Population Controls
7 As apocalyptic as this fire was, to the point that it made the international news, it is vital
to set it in context, which goes back to the 1940s and 50s, before Gikomba was founded
during the 1970s, which is distinctly political. Two elements helped to generate negative
policy  toward  small-scale  traders  at  that  time:  efforts  by  African  shopkeepers,  who
objected  to  competition  from  hawkers,  and  government  policy  that  intentionally
privileged certain traders at the expense of others. The shopkeepers, in the form of the
East Africa Traders Association, wrote to the Nairobi Acting Town Clerk in April 1942
urging tighter restrictions on the granting of hawkers’ licenses saying, «the majority of
hawkers  obtain  licences  to  cloak  various  nefarious  happenings»3.  Such  class
differentiation among traders was regarded as desirable by policymakers, who intended
not only that African shopkeepers be male and better capitalized, but also that some male
traders become shopkeepers. Gendered class formation was a conscious aim of British
administration. Thomas Colchester, the Nairobi Municipal Native Affairs Officer, stated in
the 1941 Annual Report,
The aim is to evolve a class which will, with a little capital, be able to supply more
people at lower prices... [T]he native hawker is usually a Kikuyu from 60 to 70 miles
away taking advantage of temporary booms to earn Shs. 25/- to Shs. 30/- a month
by 3 or 4 hours work a day.  He usually lives in the most overcrowded parts  of
Pumwani and rarely has his wife or family with him. What is desirable is a more
stable figure living at a higher level of subsistence and more knowledgeable in his
trade.
8 Why did such people come to Nairobi? The pay from hawking was better, he said, than
either rural or urban laborers’ pay, and the war had caused a jump in the prosperity of
the town4.
9 The British government, in its anxiety to diminish the possibilities for organized Kenyan
resistance to colonial rule, and to maintain the profits of «legitimate» larger scale non-
African  owned  businesses,  also  instituted  ever  more  stringent  population  control
measures  in  Nairobi  after  World  War  II.  During  and after  the  war  Nairobi’s  African
population skyrocketed, from 41,000 in 1939 to 70,000 in 1941, for instance, despite laws
aimed at keeping most Africans out of Nairobi. Many of these sought to earn a living
through hawking various commodities, especially foodstuffs, often from illegal locations,
which  included  everywhere  except  the  very  few  African  markets  allowed.  Licensing
traders became a chief means for controlling the burgeoning numbers of hawkers5.
10 If in rural areas the authorities wished to discourage hawking since it constituted an
alternative for Africans to labor on settler farms, in Nairobi urban administrators were
increasingly concerned about simply keeping control over a growing bumptious trading
population. The most important shift in government policy in the early 1940s was that it
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was  agreed that  trading  licenses,  «which were  at  present  only  a  revenue  producing
measure should be a control measure [emphasis mine]»6. This decision was evident in the
1941 Nairobi Annual Report, which stated, «With a view to limiting the native population
and particularly the prostitutes, passes are now being issued for permanent residents in
the town and the number of hawkers’ licences is to be reduced from 500 to a maximum of
300»7. The lower number of licenses did not accommodate most of the hawkers; Mary
Parker  estimated  that  in  1942  there  were  470  itinerant  hawkers,  225  traders,  145
shopkeepers,  150 proprietors of  eating houses,  280 skilled artisanal  workers,  and 235
service workers among the self-employed African population of Nairobi. Women seem to
have been mainly omitted from these figures, as were the hundreds of Kiambu hawkers
who traveled into Nairobi daily8. While the Nairobi Municipal Council was not willing to
forbid hawking altogether, it adopted the policy of gradually widening the number of
commodities that required licenses to sell9.
11 Neither the underground economy nor the militancy of hawkers disappeared at the end
of  World War II,  when the internal  socioeconomic crisis  became more evident –  and
acute, resulting in part in an escalated hawker war. At this time the colonial authorities
pioneered against hawkers population control measures later employed during the Mau
Mau Emergency. Their ever more stringent efforts included a February 1946 ordinance
that allowed any authority to remove any African from the Municipality for any reason
without warrant or appeal. In 1947 disorder was rampant in Pumwani and Shauri Moyo,
and the trade licensing officer said that without more help he could not control increased
trading activities involving more than 2000 unlicensed traders10.  Thomas Askwith, the
Native  Affairs  Officer,  acceded to  the  Native  Advisory  Council’s  request  and forbade
granting trade licenses to women in 1945. This ruling was cancelled, however, due to a
protest from «porige sellers» and the hardship imposed on urban women. The Nairobi
Native Advisory Council agreed that the restriction was only to apply to women coming
from the Reserves, and made so many exceptions for uji [English=porridge] sellers, who
were  supplying most  African workers  with their  meals,  that  the  prohibition became
meaningless. The result of these conditions was another rash of laws in 1949 attempting
to control both hawkers and voluntarily unemployed persons11.  Under a 1942 Nairobi
«spiv» law, 200 persons a month were picked up and deported to the reserves as vagrants
in  194912.  By  the  late  1940s  legal  restrictions  on  marketing  foodstuffs  and  traders’
movements were such that most urban Africans were dependent on the underground
economy, chiefly produce hawked by women from Kiambu and Thika, a growing town
some twenty miles north of Nairobi. One observer of the scene in 1950 commented,
If one of the happier pictures of colonial Africa is that of the District Officer and
local chief proudly surveying a cotton crop or a new village well, the most gloomy is
that of the police of East Africa harrying the vegetable sellers, usually women, on a
periodic roundup of unauthorized markets in an urban estate13.
12 The criminalization of the ordinary activities of petty traders was well established by
colonial  precedents before the Emergency,  and traders responded accordingly.  Urban
traders were, as Elkins stated, a chief target of the «complex, apartheidlike set of laws
dictating among other things where Africans could live,  where and when they could
move, what crops they could grow, and what social places they could frequent», and, I
would add, where and what they could sell, and their lack of access to banking services
and well located permanent selling premises14.
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Colonial Markets and the Mau Mau Emergency
13 The struggle over and in urban markets  was a  key element in the 1950s Emergency
declared by the British to fight urban and rural guerrillas. Both rural and urban markets
in the Nairobi area played a key role, a role recognized by the colonial government, which
took steps to remove the perceived threats presented by insurgency at these markets.
14 In Kiambu, the area adjoining Nairobi immediately to the north and west, the colonial
authorities took immediate measures to insure their control of  markets,  which could
serve as meeting places for the Land and Freedom Army (LFA), called Mau Mau by the
British. Kiambu was involved in the 1950s freedom struggle early on (LFA oathtaking
there first came to the attention of the authorities in 1950, when it was declared illegal)15,
but  rural  markets  did not  serve the purposes  of  freedom fighters  well  in the 1950s.
Government authorities found these trade centers easier to control than the dispersed
homesteads,  while  prosperous  African  and  Asian  shopkeepers  were  viewed  as  likely
collaborators with the regime. Markets were raided by the LFA and a few shopkeepers
killed16.  Shopowners  also  had  to  worry  about  the  other  side.  During  the  Emergency
loyalist Homeguards hung around the markets, sometimes vandalizing the shops of those
they viewed as Mau Mau sympathizers. The existence of smaller markets and isolated
shops worried the authorities  lest  their  shopowners be helping Mau Mau;  they were
routinely closed down. In the late 1950s when markets were allowed to reopen, loyalists
got preference in license allocations; ex-LFA members or detainees were denied them17.
15 If  rural  markets  lost  their  function as  a  political  gathering place for  men under the
Emergency,  with  shopkeepers  suffering  persecution  from  both  sides,  urban  markets
became focal points for African political action, their volatile crowded spaces providing
solidary anonymity. A number of factors helped make the Land and Freedom movement
an urban phenomenon as  well  as  a  rural  one.  Among them was discontent  with the
Nairobi trade infrastructure. Nairobi had a critical shortage of market space; yet, rather
than improving  it,  further  constriction  was  caused  by  the  application  of  Emergency
regulations.  For  instance,  in  1951  the  structures  at  Shauri  Moyo  Market  were  quite
dilapidated,  but  they were required to accommodate traders  evicted from verandahs
along River Road. In July 1952 there was an attack on the Master of Municipal Market,
which was then raided twice by the police to arrest illegal African traders. A successful
two-day boycott of vegetable supplies organized by the vegetable traders ensued. The
mayor of Nairobi was then forced to negotiate a settlement to stop it18. The traders were
clearly fed up with such harassment and organizing to resist.
16 If the immediate cause for the imposition of the Emergency was the assassination on 7
October 1952 in Kiambu of Chief Waruhiu, a Local Native Council member, the urban
variation on the same theme was the assassination of Tom Mbotela on 27 November 1952
near Burma Market. Mbotela was a Nairobi African Advisory Council member popularly
considered  to  be  an  arch-collaborator  with  the  colonial  regime.  Burma  Market  had
accommodated  displaced  traders  from  Shauri  Moyo  Market,  which  was  undergoing
renovations involving permanent construction in stone. As a result of the assassination,
the police raided Burma, finding it «ramshackle», arrested all of the traders and took
them to Kingsway Camp for interrogation. Two hours later a fire broke out at the market,
widely  supposed  to  have  been  set  by  Homeguards,  which  razed  it  completely.  The
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opening of the renovated Shauri Moyo was then moved up from the eighth to the first of
December19.
17 Kariakor20 Market was also thought by authorities to be a «black spot» and a gathering
place for «spivs» and thugs. Spiv was a British administrative acronym for Suspected
Persons and Itinerant Vagrants, and was applied pejoratively to traders, as was «drones»
21. In May 1953 the police raided it, destroyed some 600 temporary market stalls at its
rear, and arrested the occupants. Later that month they tore down illegal stalls at Shauri
Moyo. Traders at Shauri Moyo and Duke Street experienced frequent police raids, arrests,
and detentions. The worst impact on traders, however, was clearly made by Operation
Anvil, which began on 24 April 1954. Caroline Elkins has described the significance of
Nairobi  for  colonial  officials  and the magnitude of  this  operation,  the largest  British
counterinsurgency effort,  which summarily  removed thousands of  Kikuyu,  Embu and
Meru from Nairobi to concentration camps. Most of the traders came from these groups.
Nairobi was the linchpin in Britain’s military campaign against Mau Mau…There
was  an  unusual  consensus  in  the  ranks  of  both  the  military  and…civilian
government that the colony’s capital was the nerve center for Mau Mau operations.
Nearly three quarters of the city’s African male population of 60,000 were Kikuyu,
and most of these men, along with some 20,000 Kikuyu women and children…were
allegedly [Mau Mau supporters.]… They were purported also to be perpetrating a
host of other crimes, including armed robberies, the intimidation of witnesses, the
levying of ‘protection money’, and the organization of boycotts of government-run
buses and European products22.
18 In 1954 both Kariakor and Shauri Moyo were closed down completely at various points23.
The demolitions, closures and arrests were a response to the various violent incidents
centering  on  markets  and  municipally  owned  shops.  Officials  said  that  Mau  Mau
terrorists were carrying out a campaign of intimidation and had instituted a type of
protection racket aimed at Asian and other non-Kikuyu shopowners. The Duke Street
Market  was  also  burned down on 13  August  195424.  Two Homeguards  were  killed at
Kariakor  on  21  January  1955.  Despite  a  demonstration  organized  by  loyalist  Kikuyu
traders against the murderers, all Kikuyu-, Embu- and Meru- (called KEM by authorities)
owned  shops  were  closed  down  for  three  months  as  a  result.  Armed  LFA  raids  on
municipally owned dairies and butcheries resulted in their closure25.
 
Traders Organize to Resist
19 Conflicts between hawkers and authorities were at the heart of the urban incarnation of
the Land and Freedom Army movement in the 1950s. In Nairobi, as Onstad noted, «petty
traders were natural recruits for [the LFA]: most of them had a strong impetus to fight
the colonial government while their livelihood gave them a perfect cover for subversive
activities.» By 1952 when the Emergency was declared, both rural and urban traders had
organized to dispute various ordinances aimed at controlling their activities. Early 1940s
attempts  at  organization were  small  scale;  in  1942  there were  cobblers’  and banana
sellers’ guilds with about eighty members each, for instance26. But by the late 1940s large-
scale organizations were forming to protect traders’ interests. The United African Traders
Association protested the proposed 1949 Verandah Trading By-laws, which prohibited
conducting business on the porches of houses except in Asian areas, and the anti-spiv
measures.  The chairman,  Kigondu wa Machira,  met with the Town Clerk and Labour
Officer and informed them that his organization had 4000 members in twenty branches,
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including  mostly  male-dominated  occupations  such  as  tailors,  shoemakers,  painters,
charcoal  sellers,  tinsmiths,  blacksmiths  and  vegetable  dealers.  Despite  widespread
administrative support, the Verandah Trading By-laws were dropped when the Solicitor
General advised against the feasibility of outlawing this method of trade. Kamba women
traders may also have been organizing themselves into dancing troupes at this time27.
20 The colonial administration responded by stepping up repression of traders. During the
Emergency the colonial  administration turned its attention to controlling hawking in
Nairobi by drastically reducing the number of licensees, a measure also encouraged by
loyalist  successful  traders,  which became a key element in countersurgency efforts28.
From 1952 to 1957 the number of uji (sold by women) licenses stood at 105, but the total
number of hawkers’ licenses fell from 667 to 185. From 1953 to 1954 alone the number
dropped by 40029.  The cheap provisioning of workers was the chief argument used to
preserve this number, which was not affected by Operation Anvil. This argument did not
save the KEM tea hawkers, however, who were usually among the more prosperous male
traders. They were forbidden to sell completely in 1953 because they were thought to be
witnesses or accomplices to Mau Mau crimes, who refused to inform the police30. Forging
a hawker’s armband was made a criminal offence when several people tried it. Hundreds
of people were arrested for hawking without a license or hawking outside of permitted
areas. People were even arrested for picking flowers, sorting over garbage, and spitting.
Fences were built around African locations and curfews enforced. There were shortages
of commodities like charcoal and sugar due to movement restrictions on traders. Spot
raids were conducted to catch violators of the many restrictions and squatter villages like
Kariobangi were destroyed31.
21 After the most violent part of the Emergency died down the authorities decided to crack
down further, even on uji sellers; in 1958 only eighty uji licenses were given and in 1959
only  sixty32.  When  a  group  of  widows  appealed  this  reduction,  the  Chief  Municipal
Inspector of markets gave them short shrift, saying, «all unlicensed hawking must stop
and the offenders will be relentlessly prosecuted until that end is achieved. It is therefore
necessary for the widows... to take up some form of livelihood that is lawful.» Former
licensees  got  nowhere  upon  appeal.  The  General  Secretary  of  the  Nairobi  People’s
Convention Party complained to the Town Clerk about the arrests of women hawkers,
who were given Sh.50 fines or two months in prison. Other protests focused on a new
policy dictating that itinerant hawkers could only sell in their own racial areas33. For most
women traders licenses, infrastructure and the bribes necessary to get them were in any
case too expensive, nor were they granted licenses in rural areas when the few who could
afford it applied to the African District Council34.
22 The articulated goals of government policy aimed at obliterating the hawker population
concerned the security risk (with particular attention to the fact that most traders were
Kikuyu),  the  presumed  unsanitary  methods  of  operation  for  cooked  foods,  general
dirtiness,  traffic  congestion,  the  nuisance  of  traders’  importunities  to  European
housewives, and their assumed involvement in crimes more serious than the elementary
one of  illegal  hawking.  According to  Muthoni  Likimani,  Europeans  perceived women
traders during the Emergency as being, «dirty Mau Mau savages.» Another argument,
joined into by prosperous African traders, involved hawkers posing unfair competition
for  shopkeepers.  There  was  also  anxiety  about  the  possibly  dangerous  political
consequences of poverty. The 1954 Kenya government Report on Destitution said,
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The tendency to reduce the numbers of open-air traders may make a contribution
to the number of indigents. Questions of hygiene, traffic problems and no doubt
many  other  factors  induce  the  desire  in  those  responsible  to  impose  severe
limitations on the numbers of  African petty traders,  but we would nevertheless
urge that the opportunity of a modest livelihood that these activities afford should
be provided whenever possible35.
This recommendation was ignored by the authorities whenever possible.  Government
persecution  of  hawkers,  as  well  as  the  more  general  KEM removal  policies  such  as
Operation Anvil, usually most negatively affected vulnerable women and their children.
For example, because a married woman’s right to live in Nairobi was contingent upon her
husband’s status, she was automatically removed along with her husband. A letter of 28
April 1956 from Wangui w/o (wife of) Chege, a woman shopkeeper, to the Nairobi District
Commissioner shows what could happen. She was left to watch her husband’s shop for
him after he was repatriated. She complained that the Ngara chief Owiso was harassing
her in saying that she had no right to sell. But, she asserted, she was respectable, always
paid the rent, had an official pass allowing her to stay in Nairobi, and four children to
support.
Whilst  I  maintain  my  loyalty  to  her  Majesty’s  Government  I  feel  extremely
injustified [sic] by Chief Owiso’s action against me. Had I been a woman without
proper standings and left to roam in the town then his actions would be justified
and fair, however he is on the contrary and has no mercey [sic] upon my future
being together with my children. It is not the intention of the government to make
the women poor and I believe the Government is doing the best it could to see that
the African women are advanced, but with [this] action it is to reverse our progress
and stir  hatred or bad feelings by misusing the Government Policy to the loyal
citizens. I lay my trust on nobody but the British Government and I pray that Chief
Owiso be stopped from his merciless actions on me.
The Nairobi District Commissioner (DC) told the Municipal African Affairs Officer that he
was not going to reply to her as she had already been «repatriated» and was supposed to
have gone with her husband in the first place36.
 
Relaxation of Controls Surrounding Independence
(1963): The Growth of Hawking
23 By the early 1960s, the lifting of the Emergency restrictions on population movement
allowed thousands of traders to go to Nairobi. By late 1956 the authorities had trebled the
number of passes for individuals and vehicles to trade to Nairobi, while allowing many
shops to reopen37. When the numbers of hawkers at Mincing Lane wholesale Market rose
dramatically,  the Nairobi  City Council  (NCC)  Marketing Advisory Committee passed a
resolution  forbidding  retail  trade  at  Mincing  Lane  altogether,  but  to  no  effect38.
Congestion there was extreme, with many hawkers selling uninspected produce less than
100 yards away39.
24 The Kiambu District Marketing Officer described the situation in 1960.
The easing of movement restrictions and curfew has caused an absolute flood of
uninspected produce into Nairobi in the form of baskets, headloads and even small
handcarts.  Hawking  is  rife  within  the  City  and  this  burden  is  being  carried  by
legitimate wholesalers who continue to support Mincing Lane and have quantities
of produce left over at the end of a morning. For this very reason some buyers are
now  not  bothering  to  use  the  Market  when  produce  can  be  delivered  to  the
doorstep...  [If  the  produce  inspectors  do  not  do  something]  in  a  month or  two
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months, the  market  will  be  run by  the  African and Asian Traders  not  the  City
Council which to my mind is almost the position now.
25 Whether traders were coming or going,  control  mechanisms were ineffective.  Trucks
raced each other to the market and arrived earlier and earlier. Mincing Lane revenue
dropped in the face of a boycott by traders and hawkers40. Less than half of the vegetables
were now going to Mincing Lane; most were being hawked around Nairobi or were sold
directly to Asian wholesalers. Hawkers seeking selling space formed illegal markets at
Doonholm Road,  Bengal  Road and Dagoretti  Corner.  Adding to the chaotic marketing
conditions and violations of urban land use rules were a number of urban farmers who
were selling some of their produce41.
26 The escalating situation pressured an immediate increase in the number of licenses given
(with the restriction that no hawkers were to be in the Central, a.k.a. European, city).
Mincing Lane and City (formerly Municipal) Market traders asked for a reduction in stall
rents,  citing the hardships imposed by the granting of  only 800 hawkers’  licenses,  a
protest which illustrates the conflicting goals of organizations of legal stallholders and
those  of  itinerant  mainly  illegal  hawkers.  A  key  political  factor  influencing  the
liberalization of license policy was the rising number of hawkers’ organizations, formed
by men in order to defend their interests. They organized both by market and generally42.
Another  was  the  colonial  government’s  reluctant  recognition  of  the  inevitability  of
independence,  fostered  by  their  problems  with  keeping  control.  Africanization  and
politicization of the hawker struggle led to African politicians seeking hawker support
with  relaxed  controls.  In  July  1960  over  400  trading  licenses  were  issued,  and  in
November over 800. The first African mayor of Nairobi, Charles Rubia, made the granting
of more hawkers’ licenses a priority in 1962, despite the fact that 1500 had already been
issued in August. Nevertheless, illegal hawkers still predominated – by 1963 over 2000 of
them. Most of the unlicensed sellers dealt in prepared foods; many were women43.
27 By mid-1961 administrators felt that the situation was completely out of control. The
1961 Nairobi District Annual Report noted the dramatic increase in hawking and in the
number of illegal markets, called Uhuru (Kiswahili=freedom) markets, but said that the
authorities had decided to tolerate them because the government was unwilling to use
the «last tier» of Emergency legal powers to do so44. Three major hawker organizations
were formed between 1960 and 1962 and fought to obtain legal permanent or itinerant
selling space. Onstad described the situation cogently; by mid-1961 it was «as if defeated
Mau Mau had risen from the ashes, phoenix-like, in the form of militant hordes of petty
traders.» Their agenda included not only the right to secure selling space of their choice,
but also an increased number of licenses, relaxed regulations to allow permanence and
expansion of businesses and capital accumulation, and the cessation of police harassment
45.
28 As effective as the written petitions and protests were the boycotts of designated trading
locations, protest marches, and the constant street fights in which bystanders came to
the aid of hawkers resisting arrest. A typical case from the Crime and Incident Reports
occurred on 8 July 1960 when police constables from Shauri Moyo were attempting to
arrest  illegal  hawkers at  Machakos Country Bus Stop.  The police were stoned by the
crowd, only succeeded in arresting one juvenile, and had to send for reinforcements to
extract themselves from the imbroglio. Three incidents on 16 November 1960 at Shauri
Moyo Market included one in which a large crowd prevented two plainclothes officers
from making an arrest by pushing them out of the market, one being bitten on the finger,
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and two incidents in which police were stoned by the crowd. Machakos Country Bus Stop
became notorious for its rowdiness46.
29 By the end of 1962 the Nairobi City Council  had given up on trying to stop hawking
altogether and instead hoped to control it somewhat. In the scramble in 1963 for new
bylaws aimed at controlling hawkers (the old ones were invalidated by the court in 1962
as not applicable to itinerant hawkers and too general), the old ones were inadvertently
repealed with no new ones yet passed, and governmental disarray was complete47. The
Nairobi Assistant Commissioner of Police wrote to the Permanent Secretary for Local
Government, «To be perfectly honest, the Council have got themselves into such a mess
in connection with hawking that it is really immaterial what amendments are made to
the  By-Laws»,  while  the  latter  informed  his  Minister,  «Unfortunately,  like  many
problems, [hawking] has been allowed to grow because it could only have been solved by
colonial/imperialist methods and these were becoming less and less appropriate as Uhuru
drew near»48.  The remaining British officials  might  have been somewhat  maliciously
satisfied that Kenyans were having as much difficulty establishing control as they had
had.  Although  the  bylaws  were  reinstated,  this  situation  serves  as  a  symbol  of  the
inadequacy of  colonial  hawker policy under the onslaught of  postcolonial  conditions.
Arson, however, as a common event had subsided during this period with a conscious
effort not to emulate harsh colonial methods.
 
Post-independence Harassment of Traders and
Arsons: Hawker Wars
30 Can  we  say,  then,  that  post-independence  government  policy  improved,  or  has  the
criminalization of the informal sector and of government actions continued? The late
colonial period in which the colonial government used legal and extra-legal methods to
intimidate and damage traders and hawkers has distinct parallels with the period of the
late 1980s to the present.  The same two primary forces,  mercantile  and government
interests, pushed trader policy and implemented crimes against hawkers to achieve their
ends in the later period.  However,  the 1980s did not begin with the declaration of a
hawker war and followed the 1970s,  a  period of  relatively benign accommodation of
trader and hawker interests. President Daniel arap Moi assumed office peacefully in 1978
at Jomo Kenyatta’s death and seemed bent on pursuing the same erratic course of his
predecessor’s government: arrests and demolitions, not always sanctioned by the Nairobi
City Council, combined with an effort to help some traders. To some he was a defender of
the  common  people  (Kiswahili=wananchi),  more  sympathetic  than  Kenyatta,  who
dismissed the poor as ragai (lazy or useless).
31 Government help translated the recommendations of a 1974 ILO Report to promote the
informal sector into gendered applications that included measures taken to help jua kali
(English=hot/fierce sun), artisans forced by poverty to work in the open air. Although
women traders are more often without sheltered space and in the sun, the term jua kali
has  been  applied  only  to  male  manufacturers,  with  occasional  gestures  toward  the
garment industry49. Police harassment of sellers was supposed to stop. In the mid-1980s
President Moi saw to it that neat metal sheds were built for such artisans at Kamukunji
across the river from Gikomba. In 1987 a Small Scale Enterprises Unit was established
within  the  Ministry  of  National  Planning  and Development  that  emphasized  helping
Whose crime? Arson, class warfare and traders in Nairobi, 1940-2000
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 11, n°2 | 2009
10
manufacturers50.  Although the ILO considered retail sellers to be a worthy part of the
informal sector, the brunt of the conflicts fell upon them, most of them women traders,
who still have more difficulties getting permanent selling space or pursuing legal trade.
32 The  fortunes  of  the  large  dried  staples  trading  population  at  Gikomba  Market  are
emblematic of the situation for most women traders. Unlike most of Gikomba, the dried
staples area was the object of repeated attacks by NCC police. In July 1988 the women,
who had assurances from the District Officer and the local chief that they could build
without molestation, constructed a handsome set of open sheds with metal roofs and
posts  to  shelter  themselves  and  their  goods  from  the  elements.  This  construction
immeasurably bettered the whole appearance of the market. The women neatly arranged
their open bags of staples on platforms beneath the sheds. It was a prime example of the
positive  virtues  of  following  the  Kenyan  government  slogan,  harambee,  self-help
(translated by the cynical  as  help yourself).  In mid-August  the NCC police came and
without warning demolished the whole, purposefully destroying pieces of metal roofing
to prevent their reuse.
33 The arbitrary strictures of the authorities, riven by the conflicting goals of different parts
of the government, understandably bewildered this trader at Gikomba in 1988.
Here we had built shelters against the sun and the rain, but they’ve been
demolished. That’s why we are suffering. At first [the chief] told us to demolish
them. Then he told us to move down there to the vegetable sellers’ place [by the
Nairobi River]. The vegetable people had nowhere to go, but he told us to go and
squeeze in. We refused and went to the member of Parliament for this area, Maina
Wanjigi; he told us to stay. After that the chief told us that we should not construct
anything; we should stay in the sun. I don’t know why, and I don’t know much51.
34 The  permanent,  often  more  flimsy,  structures  erected  by  other  sellers  were  left
unmolested; this differentiation in treatment had occurred repeatedly. In November the
women composed a praisesong for President Moi and sent a delegation to ask him for
permanent selling space, an effective route to success for those whose political support is
perceived as being important52. However, the women did not succeed. While grassroots
rural women’s self-help efforts are lauded as promoting development, poor urban women
have had their activities disrupted and their painfully earned infrastructure destroyed.
35 In December 1987 there were at least four raids by plainclothes police on a group of River
Road streetside staples sellers, who suggested that the police wanted their confiscated
goods  for  Christmas,  while  nearby  storeowners  encouraged  the  raids  to  discourage
competition.  One  trader  said  that  in  1986  the  adjacent  storekeepers  had  each  paid
Ksh.1000 to have them removed and that sometimes the police came six times a day.
Elsewhere  several  of  the  more  established  market  stallholders  complained  about
competition from hawkers, one man calling them prostitutes53. In 1988 the major battle
over turf again involved central city areas. A Mathare Valley protection scheme reputedly
existed involving payments to KANU (ruling party) youthwingers of Ksh.5 per month to
secure freedom from NCC harassment of traders, but poor women selling on the streets in
the central city had no protection.
36 A  broader  view  of  the  impact  of  police  harassment  on  traders  comes  from  Winnie
Mitullah’s  1988 survey of  425 street  traders,  who gave the following reasons for  not
having licenses: ignorance of licensing procedures (55%); failure of attempts to get one
(13.1%); illegal sites or activities making licensing impossible (15.6%); and not affordable
(12.6%). Police harassment occurred daily or weekly for 54.2% of them, monthly for 24.4%,
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and occasionally for 21.3%, while 68.4% said that the harassment was because they were
unlicensed. In 94.9% of the cases the harassment was by the NCC police, 3.5% by KANU
youthwingers. The consequences for most traders of the harassment were that they had
their commodities confiscated, but 8.2% were convicted of trading offenses, 4.5% paid
bribes, and 2.7% had their structures demolished. Mitullah claimed that there were about
25,000 hawkers who were always at war with the authorities54. A riceseller at Ngara said
that she had been caught three times by the police with illegal rice from Mwea. The first
two times the police confiscated the rice but then sold it for her and gave her the money
because they were sympathetic about her need to pay her son’s school fees. The third
time was  not  the  charm;  the  rice  was  confiscated and she  gave  up on it.  A  woman
pineapple seller resorted to hiring a man to grab the pineapples and run if the police
appeared55. At one location a group of street sellers were raided so often that half of them
disappeared within a week, only the younger, hardier and more desperate remaining.
37 Dried staples sellers are caught in a legal impasse in which feeding Nairobi efficiently is
least  considered.  The  Deputy  Town Clerk  in  1988  said  that  they  fell  into  a  «funny»
category  and  could  not  be  licensed  under  the  bylaws  as  vegetable  sellers,  that  the
Gikomba sellers contravened the rule that sellers were not to be within 440 yards of a
roadway, and that various pressures – from politicians, business owners, the mass of the
unemployed – made for a balancing of interests between inside legal and outside illegal
traders56.
38 A key point in the steadily mounting anti-hawker campaign came in October 1990, when
all  central  city  illegal  markets  were bulldozed.  Divisions  within the government  and
public discourse were evident in the events leading up to the destruction. In February
1988 the chairman of the NCC toured Gikomba promising better garbage disposal, while
in June 1990 the Minister of Local Government ordered no more squatter settlement or
hawker demolitions. The Nairobi independent newspaper, the Daily Nation, ran a feature
article on unemployment on 10 October 1990, six days before the massive destruction,
while the NCC planned to open five new open air markets to accommodate hawkers57.
However, on 11 October 1990 at Machakos Bus Depot 300 NCC police took on hawkers
with teargas and batons and were met with active resistance including: stonethrowing
from residents  of  an adjacent  estate;  hawker-constructed barricades;  a  bonfire  lit  to
disrupt traffic (successfully); and fisticuffs. Most business in the central city stopped and
the situation was not gotten under control until late in the day, when armed groups of
NCC police still patrolled, presumably to stop «the few shabbily dressed crafty hawkers
who were trying to sell vegetables and fruit on the streets to homeward-bound workers.»
On 16 October Gikomba was bulldozed and other illegal markets destroyed58. The impact
of the destruction was major; traders roamed seeking temporary places to sell. It seemed
that illegal selling was no longer an option for most and the days had returned when the
goal  of  government  was  to  annihilate  trading  as  an  option  for  indigent  urbanites.
Increasingly  only  the  relatively  wealthy  could  trade;  traders  themselves  showed
economic, gendered divisions. A successful male trader in 1988 told Eric Onstad, «The
genuine trader is in a shop. The hawkers we see now, they are not in business; they are
just getting something to eat»59.
39 The ferocity of this attack was clearly linked to political causes. In Nairobi in July 1990
there were demonstrations centering in congested areas near or on the site of  some
illegal and legal markets (Kamukunji and Kawangware, for instance). These became riots
when the demonstrators were attacked by the police and achieved international notice
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since they involved supporters of a multiparty political system, whose leaders had been
imprisoned60.  Kinuthia  Macharia  analyzed  massive  1980s  and  90s  slum  demolitions
carried  out  in  Nairobi  from  an  ethnopolitical  point  of  view,  pointing  out  that  the
destruction  of  predominantly  Kikuyu  residential  areas  at  Kamukunji  (Muoroto)  and
Kibagare,  which  were  heavily  involved  in  the  multiparty  movement,  resulted  in  the
displacement of over 40,000 people. Wanjigi protested the demolitions, calling it another
Operation  Anvil,  which  cost  him  his  position  as  Member  of  Parliament  and  his
membership in KANU61.
40 News photos showed exclusively male hawkers battling police in October 1990. Some men
fought  but  the majority of  traders  fled,  trying to save as  much of  their  property as
possible. One woman cried as a bulldozer took down her stall, for which she had just paid
Ksh.10,000 to the market committee62. Several women said that bankruptcy was the result
of such attacks, and, on occasion, physical harm. The situation was worsening, not just at
Gikomba. A pregnant woman was seriously injured in a stampede of people waiting to get
forms to apply for NCC kiosks. Attempts to organize a queue failed and a barred door was
also broken in the rush, while officials extended the deadline for handing out forms,
giving out more than planned. Some of the kiosks were mobile and cost approximately
Ksh.15,000; others were stationary at a cost of Ksh.10,00063. Women sellers had particular
difficulty  raising  capital  to  obtain  NCC-allocated  stalls,  which  cost  Ksh.16,000  (or
approximately $940) in 1988, plus an unspecified amount in bribery (at least five years of
an average Kenyan’s income)64. Esther Wanjiru Kamau, the subject of a Daily Nation article,
had her kiosk home demolished without warning. She was getting by – doing casual labor
in the chief’s office and selling greens and other foodstuffs from the kiosk – for which she
had been paying an annual rent of Ksh.450 to the Ministry of Works. In an accompanying
photo she was glumly sitting on the wreckage with her ten children and a grandchild, all
of whom she was supporting65.
41 The immediate response of the women whose stalls were destroyed in 1988 was to seek
the use of political influence – a patron to protect them. Thomas noted in 1985 that there
was growing pressure on these groups to contribute money for political purposes; they
were being forced into politics66. Even itinerant hawkers were organizing. In March 1989
over 300 women hawkers, typically aged thirty or more and the sole support of their
families,  marched to the Nairobi Provincial  Commissioner’s Office to protest constant
harassment by the askaris [English=police]. Upon being denied entrance to the Provincial
Commissioner’s office and that of the Director of the City Inspectorate, they blocked the
County Hall entrance until the Director came out to talk to them. He agreed to issue all of
them hawkers’ licenses, but at a rate which they refused as too high. One woman shouted,
«We sell our vegetables from estate to estate and we make too little income to meet the
licence fee!» Photos accompanying the article showed women, some aged in their sixties
and seventies,  with arms raised militantly67.  In early 1992 a group of  elderly Kikuyu
mothers  of  political  prisoners  took refuge in  Nairobi  Cathedral  after  an Uhuru Park
protest that included a hunger strike was attacked by police. In support the hawkers at
Gikomba and Machakos Bus Stop instigated a boycott that became a riot68.
42 Thus,  in the 1990s the two forces of  moneyed interests  and the government worked
together, just as the police were called on regularly by 1980s shopkeepers to remove the
street traders in front of their shops. The struggle again was a gendered embodiment of
conflicting class  interests.  Indeed,  if  the 1990s  were marked by continual  attacks  on
traders in various locations, in 2000 the crime of arson emerged again as a tactic in an
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ongoing war on traders.  The more immediate context for the burning of Gikomba in
September  2000  includes,  for  instance,  a  strong attack  on 4  March,  1999,  when two
truckloads of NCC askaris demolished a large section of Gikomba by pulling down stall
structures between 10 pm and 3 am the day after a fire razed timber stalls, furniture
workshops and secondhand clothing stalls. The Daily Nation’s account said that a dispute
between a former market chairman and stallholders led to the attack. Traders said that,
they were being evicted to pave [the] way for modern stalls. The man, they said,
was soliciting for Sh50,000 from people he wanted to allocate stalls [sic]. He had
collected more than Sh20 million, they claimed. The chairman of the market, Mr.
Daniel Macharia Kuria, said they had filed a case to block the eviction. «We had met
the town clerk and the director of the city inspectorate to discuss the two-year-old
row. They assured us that the demolition had been suspended for the matter to be
solved,»  he said.  Mr.  Kuria  said the action had deprived many families  of  their
livelihood. Bondeni Ward Councillor Kenneth Irungu, who led the demonstrators to
City  Hall,  said the action was «barbaric».  At  City  Hall  10 representatives  of  the
traders and Councillor Irungu held a two-hour meeting with Mr. Mbugua and Mrs.
Wandera. Other traders were locked out. After the meeting, Mr. Mbugua said they
had instructed the traders to go to Dagoretti  [police station] and pick[up] their
property.  The  mayor  said  the  confusion  had  been  caused  by  the  three  groups
involved – the people allocated the land, stall holders and hawkers69.
The report nicely summarized the conflicting interests and class divisions among traders
that made Gikomba vulnerable to lethal attacks in which poorer traders suffered the
most.
43 The September 2000 Gikomba fire, in fact, followed a series of fires at markets in Nairobi
and  elsewhere  in  Kenya.  The  fires  deemed  newsworthy  in  2000  before  6 September
included:  8  February,  secondhand clothes  stalls  at  Nakuru  (blamed on  arsonists);  23
February, jua kali sheds at Thika; 18 March, Garissa open air market (arson); 6 August,
stalls at Kisumu; and 21 August, complete destruction of Freemark Market at Uhuru Park
in Nairobi70. The class nature of this hawker war became even more obvious in the events
immediately  following  the  6  September  fire.  As  in  the  1950s,  the  Gikomba  struggle
became conflated with the increasingly violent politics accompanying elections. Agence
France-Presse reported,
a riot [was triggered by the fire] among vendors, who said they suspected arson.
Unrest spread to neighbouring areas, cutting off eastern and northeastern roads
into the city. Police used teargas to battle against protestors wielding sticks, stones
and  other  crude  missiles.  Witnesses  said  the  situation  got  out  of  hand  when
opposition member of parliament James Orengo coincidentally arrived at the scene
[at the same time as] a convoy with the body of an opposition activist who had been
killed when police violently broke up a pro-reform rally by the MP on August 19.
Police had earlier banned attempts to transport the body from the city morgue to
the  victim’s  house  in  Kamukunji  for  an  overnight  stay,  before  it  was  taken  to
central Kenya for burial on Thursday. Finding a stand-off between the police and
vendors, Orengo alighted to address the market traders, witnesses said. Fighting
erupted immediately between police and vendors trying to break through to the
city centre to attack shops owned by Asians, forcing even the MP to flee, witnesses
said. The traders wanted to attack Asian-owned shops because they suspected city
officials had allocated their market territory to Asian developers. Rioters also tried
to march on City Hall, but were dispersed before the clashes finally died down on
Wednesday71.
44 Most traders believed that the government had a strong hand in the arsons since other
kinds  of  government  attacks  had  become  so  commonplace72.  The  police  have  often
become predators regarding traders, as recounted in numerous stories told me by traders
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about extortion,  and confirmed by my own observations and newspaper reports.  For
instance, in June 2000 three policemen extorted Ksh.50,000 from a trader on Kirinyaga
Road in Nairobi73. Police methods routinely include torture of suspects, as reported by the
U.N., using specific examples from Kiambu, and confirmed by oral sources74.  Even the
payments made by this researcher for research assistance had to be surreptitious in order
to prevent local police discovering and extorting them from my assistants. This strategy
sometimes failed in any case, so they were robbed.
 
Government Responsibility: Reform?
45 How far is the central government responsible for these arsons, assaults and robberies?
The indicators are mixed regarding government involvement in market arsons. Since the
importation of secondhand clothing was widely believed to be controlled by associates of
President Moi, burning Gikomba’s used clothing section made no sense in that regard.
However, because NCC attacks on Gikomba have been long-term, unequivocal and vicious,
traders’ attribution of responsibility for the arsons to the government makes sense out of
their palpable misery. After the 6 September fire Jane Wambui, a Gikomba trader, said,
«Nobody was trying to put it out, there was no water. Some people were fainting, some
people were crying.  We can start  again but  we have no money...we are hungry,  our
children are hungry»75. The rending conflicts over Gikomba pit developers, who want the
land, abetted by corrupt government officials who sell them the ostensibly «public» land,
against  the majority  of  the  traders,  stallholders  and hawkers,  who lead  increasingly
desperate lives on the edge. Thus, speculation over the causes of the fire/s inevitably
centered on, as one news report stated, «well-connected members of the species that has
given capitalism in Kenya a bad name, the private developers, [who] had hired arsonists
to destroy Gikomba so they could grab the land»76. The fact that the fires (and the police
attacks) mostly happen at night when they are least likely to be fought fuelled suspicions,
nor did condolences from prominent government officials such as the Vice-President and
the Minister of State allay them77. There was no official inquiry into the causes of any of
these fires, furthering the belief that government either employed agents to start them or
at the least condoned them.
46 The context for the 6 September fire also includes subsequent events: arson at Garissa
Lodge Somali market in Eastleigh in Nairobi in December 2000, a fire that killed at least
three  people;  and  arson  that  destroyed  Kangemi  Market,  a  large  legal  market  with
hundreds of sellers in a Nairobi suburban slum78. In a case that seems to epitomize police
actions toward traders, on 1 November 2001 a Gikomba secondhand clothes dealer was
robbed by a gunwielding gang of six men and taken to Aga Khan Hospital by a friend in
his car, whereupon police stormed the Casualty Department and arrested him, having
mistaken him for one of the gang who robbed him. In addition, two other traders were
seriously injured by the gunfire as the robbers tried to escape. Police shot and killed two
of the gang79.  But there is a certain convergence of the activities of gangs and police.
While some uniformed police may openly extort bribes (I observed more than one at this
activity),  others  change clothes  and form or  join  gangs  at  night  to  rob,  assault  and
otherwise terrorize civilians—from the victims of carjackings to poor traders.
47 The sources of Nairobi crime are multiple, but the primary blame for it lies with the
government, some of whose members have increasingly vitiated laws regarding sanctity
of  persons  and  property  and  felonious  assaults  by  their  routine  contravention.  In
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following  the  colonial  pattern  of  criminalizing  informal  sector  participation,  the
government has implemented crimes itself. Self-help has truly become helping yourself
for some of the powerful and wealthy. Since self-help for the urban poor now requires
informal  sector  participation,  this  collision  course  charted  by  a  government  set  on
profiting  at  their  expense  will  only  be  conducive  to  more  massive  conflagrations  of
various kinds. The pattern of the 1950s seems now to be established once again, a pattern
that led to the overthrow of an oppressive government at that time. The Moi government
has  now  also  been  replaced,  but  corruption  continues. Unless  a  radical  economic
restructuring fuelled by a refurbishing of moral sense takes place, it is difficult to see a
way  forward  that  does  not  involve  even  more  drastic  violence,  both  government-
sponsored and not. Most people just want to earn a peaceful living and are only forced to
violence when defending their livelihoods from what they see as unjustified impositions.
In effect, whatever the laws governing traders, and whatever politicians say to hawkers at
election time, government policy regarding traders has become the crimes of property
theft and destruction, aided by assaults and robberies, and enabled by the criminalization
of  the  traders’  ordinary  activities  and  the  alliance  between  the  government  and
propertied interests. Class warfare has become an ongoing phenomenon, expressed in
this case most characteristically as arson.
48 So, after independence the new government drew on colonialist-introduced techniques to
control trade and traders when it was expedient to do so, perpetuating vagrancy laws and
antihawker, antisquatter policies. If occasional humanitarian concerns and perceptions of
possible political benefit diminished the persecution in the 1970s, they never stopped it.
Indeed,  the oppressiveness of  the system in which the police are struggling from an
underprivileged position to carry out the wishes of the ruling class is intensified by its
divisive effects. Government persecution of traders or squatters in effect supplements the
pay of police, who have demonstrated against irregular pay80. The low pay or lack of pay
for the police is a systemic problem that could be solved by cracking down on corruption
up the line. Police abuses could be diminished by reforming the police to concentrate on
service rather than control, while also reforming informal sector laws and policies to
accommodate survival needs of the population.
49 Cooper has described the situation well.
Harassing squatters, beer brewers and prostitutes underlined the hegemony of the
dominant  class,  whose orderly  ways  were made to  appear  legitimate,  while  the
‘illegitimacy’ of lower-class life was rubbed in by the humiliation of police raids.
Such an urban policy might also preclude other forms of control, cooptation and
legitimacy, and make more difficult the development of a hierarchy of privileges
and incentives that would encourage a differentiated and respectable working class
instead of a threatening urban mass81.
50 With  government  authoritarian  tendencies  exacerbated,  immediate  political
considerations outweigh the necessity not only to provide employment but also to feed
Nairobi. Harming the distributive system penalizes both traders and the general populace
by  undermining  a  cheap  urban  food  supply.  Criminalizing  many  survival-oriented
strategies of an underclass makes it inevitable that they will break the law, and «seek by
noncompliance and resistance to influence the state to change.» They have become adept
at  deploying  what  James  Scott  called  «everyday  forms  of  resistance»  to  defend
themselves and their livelihoods against the depredations of various arms of the state82.
The wellbeing of traders’ families depends on them. Much of Gikomba was flattened early
in 1987. It was rebuilt then, after the 1988 destruction, and after the 1999 and 2000 fires.
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The  arsons  continue,  but  so  does  the  determination  of  those  afflicted  by  them.  A
destructive  cycle  has  been created  involving  class  warfare  and  crimes  sponsored  by
members of the propertied class and the criminalization of the informal sector, all of
which mandates the immediate implementation of innovative reforms.
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ABSTRACTS
This article concerns the crime of arson at Nairobi (Kenya), which became common in the 1950s
Mau Mau Emergency when the British colonial government was attempting to control a growing
insurgent movement, the Land and Freedom Army, which used urban African markets as one of
its key loci for organization. Many traders were involved in the insurgency and the government
used arson to burn them out, before deporting most of them to the reserves in Operation Anvil.
The constant struggle over urban space continued after Kenyan independence in 1963, when in
the  1990s  and  later,  in  particular,  arson  once  again  became  a  key  tactic  used  by  corrupt
government officials in alliance with developers to get control over prime urban land. The best
example is the five-day Gikomba Market fire that destroyed most of it, but not the will of the
sellers to rebuild. It is widely believed that the thugs who burned the market did so for hire.
Thus, the class struggle continued, embodied in the crime of arson between a privileged class
including  high  government  officials  and  developers  and  an  insurgent  underclass  bent  on
survival.
Cet article porte sur le crime d’incendie volontaire à Nairobi (Kenya), qui se développa dans les
années  1950, au  cours  de  l’insurrection  Mau  Mau.  À l’époque,  le  gouvernement  colonial
britannique cherchait à contrôler l’essor de la Land and Freedom Army pour laquelle les marchés
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urbains  africains  représentaient  un  des  principaux  centres  d’organisation.  De  nombreux
négociants  étaient  impliqués  dans  l’insurrection  et  le  gouvernement  employait  l’incendie
volontaire pour se débarrasser d’eux, avant d’en déporter la plupart dans des réserves dans le
cadre  de  l’Opération  Anvil.  La  lutte  constante  pour  l’espace  urbain  se  perpétua  après
l’indépendance  kenyane  de  1963,  en  particulier  lorsqu’à  partir  des  années  1990,  l’incendie
redevint  un instrument-clé  utilisé  par  des  fonctionnaires  corrompus alliés  à  des  promoteurs
immobiliers cherchant à s’emparer des meilleures parcelles urbaines. Le meilleur exemple en est
l’incendie du Marché Gikomba qui dura cinq jours et en détruisit la plus grande partie, sans pour
autant briser la volonté des marchands de le reconstruire. L’idée que les incendiaires étaient
stipendiés est couramment acceptée. De sorte que l’incendie volontaire incarne la lutte de classe
persistante entre des privilégiés – comprenant des hauts fonctionnaires et des promoteurs – et
une classe défavorisée révoltée luttant pour sa survie.
AUTHOR
CLAIRE C. ROBERTSON
The Ohio State University, Dept of History, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus OH,
43210-1267 USA, robertson.8@osu.edu
The Ohio State University. Claire Robertson is Professor of Women Studies and History at the
Ohio State University. She has published six books and numerous articles, among which Sharing
the Same Bowl (Indiana U.P. 1984) has received the African Studies Association’s Herskovits Book
Award (1985), and Trouble Showed the Way. Women, Men and Trade in the Nairobi Area 1890-1990 
(Indiana U.P. 1997), which dealt with small women traders in Nairobi, has suggested the issues
discussed in this article.
Whose crime? Arson, class warfare and traders in Nairobi, 1940-2000
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 11, n°2 | 2009
23
